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Abstract 
This paper raises some questions about the possible impact of the UK leaving the European Union on 
the career pathways of mobile and internationally-oriented PhD graduates interested in an academic 
career in law, with particular reference to the specific case of the European University Institute (EUI). 
It first addresses some of the reasons for the popularity of the UK academic job market as a 
destination for EUI law graduates and then considers the potential impact of Brexit on these factors. 
While a number of factors have made the UK an attractive market for these highly mobile young 
scholars, their mobility means that should the balance shift, other countries may replace the UK as 
top choice. 
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Introduction 
In this short paper we aim to raise some questions about the possible impact of the UK leaving the 
European Union on the career pathways of mobile and internationally-oriented PhD graduates 
interested in an academic career in law. We do this with particular reference to the specific case of 
the European University Institute (EUI), in part because we have both spent time there as well as in 
UK academia,1 but also because of the EUI’s distinctive characteristics as an institution whose central 
raison d’être is to produce excellent PhD graduates in the social sciences and humanities, bringing 
together doctoral (and post-doctoral) researchers from across Europe.    
The EUI produces a relatively large group of PhD law graduates annually (174 in the five years 2012-
20172). They come from all over Europe (the EUI has 23 Member States as well as association 
arrangements with other European countries such as Norway, Iceland and Switzerland), together 
with a few from beyond Europe. A significant proportion of these graduates follow an academic 
career path: 55% of EUI law graduates, according to the most recent survey.3 The EUI’s Law 
Department has a particular expertise and research emphasis in international, transnational and 
European (public and private) law. 
EUI PhD researchers are funded by national grants and its PhD is recognised by all its Member 
States; nevertheless, as an international organisation it sits to some extent outside all national 
                                                          
1 Marise Cremona was a professor in the law department of the EUI from 2006 until 2017, and is now Emeritus 
Professor; before joining the EUI she was at the Centre for Commercial Law Studies, QMUL. Angelos 
Dimopoulos studied for his PhD at the EUI between 2006 and 2010 and has since worked in the Netherlands 
and the UK (QMUL). 
2 The statistics relating to the EUI are taken from the latest self-evaluation report of the EUI’s Law Department 
2012-2017, published February 2018 (on file with the authors). 
3 Law Department Self-Evaluation Report 2012-2017, note 2. For the report of a survey conducted in 2012 by 
the EUI’s Academic Careers Observatory into the job market experience of EUI doctoral and post-doctoral 
researchers, see Academic Careers Observatory, Job Market Survey Report (European University Institute, 
2012) <https://www.eui.eu/Documents/MWP/AcademicCareers/Workshop/ACOJobMarketSurveyReport.pdf>  
accessed 9 January 2019.  
systems. EUI graduates have thus already made a conscious decision to move away from their 
national academic system to do their PhD at the EUI, and although some do return to their home 
country after their doctorate, many do not. Their working language is English, the teaching medium 
is English, and although there is no requirement to this effect the vast majority of EUI PhDs are in 
English.4 These graduates are therefore inherently more mobile and are prepared to consider – and 
perhaps have a preference for – a position in a country other than their own. They tend to regard 
the whole of the EU as their potential job market.5 And among EU countries, the UK has been an 
especially favoured destination.  
In what follows we will first briefly explain the popularity of the UK academic job market as a 
destination for EUI law graduates and then consider the potential impact of Brexit on these factors. 
While a number of factors have made the UK an attractive market for these highly mobile young 
scholars, their mobility means that should the balance shift, other countries may replace the UK as 
top choice. 
 
Explaining the popularity of the UK 
The UK currently attracts a significant proportion of internationally-mobile young academics. Among 
EUI law graduates who go on to academic jobs, more than 20% take up academic positions in the 
UK. The UK is in the top position alongside the Netherlands, with significantly more than any other 
country.6 In addition – based on anecdotal evidence – many graduates who start their academic 
career in the Netherlands go on to a position in the UK.  
The reasons for the popularity of the UK market are diverse, and based on factors affecting both 
demand and supply.  It is an expanding market: the number of academic staff has grown steadily 
since 2010 and student numbers have also risen.7 Although it is relatively mobile and the number of 
temporary contracts is increasing, it still offers higher job security than many European competitors:  
in Germany, for example, 85% of staff not at professorial level are on temporary contracts.8 Some 
national markets are still not open to those who have not followed a traditional national academic 
training: in Spain, for example, 95% of professors obtaining new positions already held a position in 
the same institution.9  The UK market is perceived to be – and still is, relatively-speaking – more 
                                                          
4 For example, out of 174 theses successfully defended in the EUI Law Department between 2012 and 2017, 9 
were in French and 1 in Spanish; the rest were in English: Law Department Self-Evaluation Report 2012-2017, 
note 2. 
5 This is particularly true of lawyers; economists and to some extent political scientists will also consider the US 
job market. 
6 The top four destinations among the 2012-2017 EUI graduates were the UK (18), The Netherlands (18), Italy 
(12) and Germany (10; Law Department Self-Evaluation Report 2012-2017, note 2. 
7 On staff numbers, see Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA), ‘Staff numbers and characteristics’, 
https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-analysis/staff, accessed 12 February 2019.  On student numbers, see HESA, 
‘First year higher education (HE) student enrolments by level of study, Academic years 2008/09 to 2017/18’, 
https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-analysis/sb252/figure-1, accessed 12 February 2019.  
8  J Grove, ‘Academic fixed-term jobs changes in Germany split opinion’, Times Higher Education, 6 April 2017, 
citing an analysis by German Rectors' Conference (the Hochschulrektorenkonferenz), 
<https://www.timeshighereducation.com/unijobs/article/academic-fixed-term-jobs-changes-germany-split-
opinion/> accessed 9 January 2019. 
9 P Álvarez and M Marín Yarza, ‘La endogamia alcanza al 73% de los docents’, El País, 30 November 2014. 
<http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2014/11/28/actualidad/1417196515_775495.html> accessed 9 January 
2019. 
open to non-UK graduates, not only in terms of initial entry but also in career progression.10 UK 
academia offers comparatively better career development opportunities, especially for early and 
mid-career academics. To this we may add the low language barrier, given the predominance of 
English as the lingua franca of scholarship; and the UK’s very strong reputation in EU and 
international law, in itself a draw for those working in those fields. 
The UK thus remains a popular destination despite research findings that UK academics suffer from 
overwork, high stress and a managerial culture.11 
 
Brexit and its impact on mobile EU academics 
EU nationals form a significant proportion of the academic staff in Higher Education in the UK: in 
2017, 19% of academic staff in UK universities (24% in Russell Group institutions) were EU nationals, 
an increase from 12% (15% in Russell Group institutions) in 2004.12 Since the referendum in 2016 the 
overall percentage of EU academics in UK universities has ceased growing but has not (yet) dropped 
significantly; however, there has been a slight decrease in the percentage of young, entry-level 
academics (aged 34 and under) from 26.99% to 26.61%, since 2016.13  
Some of the factors which were identified above as making the UK an attractive first destination for 
young mobile academics will not be directly or immediately impacted by Brexit: the language, career 
opportunities for entry and mid-level academics, and the openness of the market are likely to 
remain stable. Barriers to entry to non-UK academic markets in Europe remain high.  Nevertheless, a 
number of factors may make the UK market less attractive. Some of these are structural to that 
market, and some personal to the individual academic deciding on her options. 
 
The structural impacts include the following. 
First, Brexit will have an impact on the competitive position of UK universities. Rising fees as EU 
students are charged full overseas student rates and lose access to student loan schemes, alongside 
the increasing international competitiveness of alternative programmes within the EU (such as those 
                                                          
10 ‘Senior figures within HEIs are less concerned about employing international staff per se than about ensuring 
that UK universities remain competitive and can recruit the best possible staff.’ M Gustafsson & T Borgar 
Hansen, POCARIM: Mapping the Population, Careers, Mobilities and Impacts of Advanced Research Degree 
Graduates in Social Sciences and Humanities (Oxford Research, 2012) 8, citing D Mills, A Jepson, T Coxon, M 
Easterby-Smith, P Hawkins, & J Spencer, Demographic Review of the UK Social Sciences (ESRC, 2006).  
11  See eg J Grove, ‘THE University Workplace Survey 2016: results and analysis’, Times Higher Education, 4 
February 2016, <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/features/university-workplace-survey-2016-results-
and-analysis>  accessed 9 January 2019. 
12 G Marini ‘Are EU university academics leaving the UK because of Brexit?’ Centre for Global Higher Education, 
Policy Briefing No.7, 30 May 2018. <https://www.researchcghe.org/perch/resources/publications/pb7.pdf> 
accessed 9 January 2019. 
13 G Marini ‘Are EU university academics leaving the UK because of Brexit?’ Centre for Global Higher Education, 
Policy Briefing No.7, 30 May 2018. <https://www.researchcghe.org/perch/resources/publications/pb7.pdf> 
accessed 9 January 2019. On the reduction in applications for positions and fellowships from early-career 
academics from the EU, see Professor Michael Arthur and others, oral evidence to the House of Commons 
Committee on Exiting the EU (The progress of the UK’s negotiations on EU withdrawal, HC 372) 16 May 2018, 
Q1717 and Q1718. 
<http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/exiting-the-
european-union-committee/the-progress-of-the-uks-negotiations-on-eu-withdrawal/oral/83138.html> 
accessed 9 January 2019. 
offered by universities in the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark) are likely to affect student 
numbers and the financial position of universities.14 In addition, many research-led universities will 
suffer from losing access to EU research funding.15 The growth of the sector may slow, resulting in 
fewer job openings and a negative impact on career prospects for younger academics. 
Second, questions arise over the future of EU law in UK law schools, and thus the demand for 
teachers, the ability of UK universities to retain its currently very high reputation in EU law, and the 
medium / longer-term attractiveness of the UK as a place to study and do research in EU law.  
Third, the openness of the UK academic market is likely to be adversely affected by the 
government’s proposed immigration policy. At the time of writing this is still at proposal stage,16 but 
the indications are that a cap on high-skilled workers and / or the proposed minimum salary 
threshold for a Tier 2 visa (£30,000 p.a.), as well as the increased costs associated with employing EU 
/ EEA nationals will represent a significant change, especially for entry-level posts where recruitment 
is likely to be below the minimum salary threshold.  
Fourth, and related to this, there are worrying signs that it is becoming increasingly difficult for non-
EU scholars to visit UK academic events and conferences, due to visa restrictions. After Brexit, 
visitors from EU / EEA countries may be subject to the same controls (whether they will or not is still 
unclear). Apart from the impoverishment of UK academic life that this represents at an individual 
level, organisers of international academic events have started to argue that the UK should no longer 
be considered a suitable venue, since even highly eminent academics may be refused entry.17   
These factors suggest that UK universities will be at risk of falling from their current very high 
position in world rankings, and as a result losing some of their attraction as top-ranking places to 
work for the best young scholars.18 
                                                          
14 EU students represent 6% of all students at UK universities. According to a recent report, the number of EU 
students starting postgraduate taught courses fell by 5%, and the number of EU postgraduate researcher 
registrations fell by 9% in 2018-19 as compared with 2017-18. J Grove, ‘Postgraduate numbers plummet amid 
fears for no-deal Brexit’, Times Higher Education, 4 January 2019. 
 <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/postgraduate-numbers-plummet-amid-fears-no-deal-brexit> 
accessed 9 January 2019. Note however that according to HESA, since 2012/13 the number of first year 
students from China each year has exceeded the number from all EU countries combined: HESA, ‘First year 
non-UK domicile students by domicile, Academic years 2006/07 to 2017/18’, https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-
and-analysis/students/where-from, accessed 12 February 2019.  
15 Under Articles 137 and 138 of the draft Withdrawal Agreement, the UK will continue to participate in 
research programmes under the 2014-2020 financial framework until 2020. A future agreement may be 
concluded between the UK and the EU allowing the former to contribute to and participate in future EU-
funded research programmes: see draft Political Declaration setting out the framework for the future 
relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom, Council doc. XT 21095/18, 22 November 
2018, para 11. However, such an agreement and its terms are far from certain. See further British Academy 
Briefing, ‘Association with European Union Framework Programmes for Research & Innovation: Challenges and 
Opportunities’, December 2018, https://www.thebritishacademy.ac.uk/sites/default/files/EU-Framework-
British-Academy-Brexit-Briefing.pdf, accessed 12 February 2019. 
16 British Government White Paper, ‘The UK’s future skills-based immigration system’, December 2018, Cm 
9722. 
17 See eg A Fazackerley, ‘University conferences at risk as academic speakers refused UK visas’ The Guardian, 
26 September 2017; M Weaver, ‘WHO voices alarm as academics denied visas to visit UK conference’ The 
Guardian, 9 October 2018. 
18 ‘In 20 years’ time, instead of being second in the world to the United States of America, I’m worried that we 
will be 20th or so. We will sit there asking, “How did that happen?”, and part of it will be this insidious onset of 
inability to recruit the world's greatest talent.’ Professor Michael Arthur, oral evidence to the House of 
At the level of the individual junior academic looking for a first or second position, a number of 
negative factors may impact a decision to target the UK job market. 
 
First, UK universities have until now had a very good track record in securing EU research funding.19 
Access to such funding is put into question by the type of future relationship currently being 
considered by the UK government, and even were it included in a future agreement, it would not be 
on the same basis as an EU Member State. For example, the leadership role played by UK 
universities in collaborative research bids will change.20 The ability to attract research funds, as well 
as offering increased research opportunities, has become an important step in the career 
progression of academics, and especially early stage researchers. Exclusion from (for example) ERC 
Starting Grants will have a negative impact.21 Even if the UK government were in the long-term to 
replace the EU funding currently enjoyed by UK-based academics, ERC and other EU research 
funding such as the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowships have acquired a reputational cachet which 
will be difficult to replicate.    
Second (and related), exclusion from – or more limited access to – transnational research networks 
arising out of research projects will negatively impact the careers of young academics seeking to 
establish a place in the community of scholars working in the field. Of course, Brexit will not mean 
that the UK is cut off from collaborative research networks, but it is likely to be more difficult to 
establish them across borders.  
Third, barriers to mobility would re-emerge. For young, internationally-minded scholars ease of 
mobility is an important factor. The loss of the benefits that EU-national workers currently enjoy in 
the UK – including, importantly, the rights of family members and the corresponding lack of security 
– are likely to be an important disincentive to join UK academia.22 While the rights of those currently 
working in the UK may be partially preserved (assuming the Withdrawal Agreement is ratified), this 
will be dependent on the individual’s continued residence in the UK; an exit decision would risk 
becoming permanent and the temporary mobility of academic staff would be more difficult: periods 
of study leave spent outside the UK, for example, may prevent the acquisition of ‘settled status’.  
It should be added that the above is postulated on the assumption that Brexit takes places within 
the framework of a Withdrawal Agreement and a transitional period, which would protect the rights 
                                                          
Commons Committee on Exiting the EU, note 13, Q1705. 
<http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/exiting-the-
european-union-committee/the-progress-of-the-uks-negotiations-on-eu-withdrawal/oral/83138.html> 
accessed 9 January 2019.  
19 The Royal Society, ‘UK research and the European Union The role of the EU in funding UK research’, 2015, 
https://royalsociety.org/topics-policy/projects/uk-research-and-european-union/role-of-EU-in-funding-UK-
research/how-much-funding-does-uk-get-in-comparison-with-other-countries/, accessed 12 February 2019.  
20 This is already happening: see evidence by Dr Sarah Main and Professor Michael Arthur to the Committee on 
Exiting the EU, note 13, Q1708-1709. 
21 In 2018, 50 out of 67 ERC Starter Grants won by the UK were awarded to non-UK nationals. European 
Research Council, ‘ERC Starting Grants 2018 Outcome: Indicative statistics’, 6. 
<https://erc.europa.eu/sites/default/files/document/file/erc_2018_stg_statistics.pdf> accessed 9 January 
2019. 
22 ‘There is a ready supply of talent that comes to this country at PhD student stage or early career researcher 
stage, many of whom stay on and make their careers here. They have been able to do that in the full 
knowledge that, as European citizens, they have full rights in this country. What does that future look like for 
them? If you were one of those individuals, would you make the decision to leave your home country and 
come to the UK if there was uncertainty?’ Professor Michael Arthur, oral evidence to the House of Commons 
Committee on Exiting the EU, note 13, Q1703. 
of EU27 nationals currently working in the UK (and UK nationals working in the EU27). Should the UK 
exit the EU without a Withdrawal Agreement, the position would be highly unpredictable, the 
exodus of EU27 academics from the UK likely to be much higher, and the impact on UK universities 
very severe.   
EUI law graduates, as we have argued, may be said to exemplify internationally mobile early-career 
academics, and as such are likely to be impacted by Brexit in the ways we have suggested here. 
However, in the discussion so far we have focused on the position of EU27 academics working in the 
UK. Brexit, of course, also affects the career prospects of young UK academics, including those who 
have taken, or will take, their PhD at the EUI.   
The EUI is an international organisation, institutionally separate from the EU. Just as not all EU 
Member States are EUI members,23 Brexit does not imply that the UK should also withdraw from the 
EUI, and we must hope that it would not choose to do so, or – should it decide to withdraw – that it 
will enter into an agreement with the EUI enabling it to continue to fund doctorates there.24 The EUI 
law graduates impacted by Brexit may well therefore include researchers in receipt of UK PhD 
grants. Those EUI graduates who are UK nationals (or, better, UK resident non-EU nationals25) will be 
more seriously impacted than EUI graduates from the EU27. The latter may, as argued above, find 
that the UK academic market is less attractive and less accessible. EUI graduates from the UK, 
however, will experience increased obstacles to mobility across the EU-wide academic job market – 
as, of course, will UK nationals who complete their academic training in UK universities. Even those 
who start work in an EU27 university before Brexit or during the transitional period will find their 
intra-EU mobility – their ability to move to another EU Member State – restricted. The precise terms 
of intra-EU mobility will depend on the terms of the EU-UK future agreement, but on the assumption 
that it does not include freedom of movement for people, opportunities for work within EU 
universities will depend on the immigration policies of individual Member States, and UK academics 
will not have any automatic rights.  
We are thus likely to see a greater proportion of EUI PhD graduates who are UK nationals returning 
to work in the UK, and staying there. As already mentioned, short-term mobility will be more 
difficult and UK early career academics will have a less ‘European’ career pattern. The impact will be 
a personal one on the individual academic, but will also affect the culture of UK law schools, insofar 
as we may see not only fewer members of staff from elsewhere in Europe but also UK staff with less 
experience of working outside the UK.  
 
Conclusion – the impact of Brexit mitigation strategies 
Unsurprisingly, UK universities are putting in place strategies to attempt to mitigate some of the 
likely impacts outlined above. However speculative these predictions may be, some impacts are 
already being felt and any Brexit outcome will only increase them. Some of these strategies involve 
putting pressure on government to treat continued research collaboration and involvement in EU-
                                                          
23 The EUI currently has 23 members. 
24 At the time of writing, a draft Statutory Instrument has been published on the UK’s membership of the EUI, 
which presupposes that the UK will ‘automatically’ withdraw from the EUI as a result of Brexit (The European 
University Institute (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, published 7 February 2019); this does not, however, follow 
from the text of the EUI Convention and withdrawal would certainly require negotiation of withdrawal terms 
with the other EUI Members. 
25 Since the UK grant criteria are residence-based, not all recipients of the UK grants are UK nationals. 
funded research programmes as a priority, as well as putting in place provision to ease researcher 
and student mobility. These initiatives fall outside the scope of this short paper. However, one 
strategy should be mentioned here, although its potential impacts are even more speculative. A 
number of UK universities have been preparing for Brexit by building institutional partnerships with 
other EU universities.26 To take only a couple of examples, the University of Glasgow has established 
a joint research centre with Leuphana University of Lüneburg in Germany;27 the University of 
Warwick has a partnership with the University of Paris Seine and Vrije Universiteit Brussels;28 and 
Oxford University has agreed a partnership with four universities in Berlin (the Freie Universität 
Berlin, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Technische Universität Berlin, and the Charité – 
Universitätsmedizin Berlin).29 These partnerships, it is planned, will include joint teaching and 
research programmes and will allow the UK universities some continued access to EU research 
funds. The medium / long-term implications of these initiatives (of which we are likely to see more) 
are difficult to assess, but three predictions can be made which are relevant to the subject of this 
paper. 
First, these partnerships may well encourage inter-institutional staff (and student) mobility, 
somewhat off-setting the impact of Brexit. This would be a positive outcome, but the nature of that 
mobility will be different: it would be academic mobility within defined groups of universities and 
research institutions, and thus more institutionally managed than simply an individual academic’s 
life-choice.  
Second, the institutional links are institution-wide, not faculty, department or research-group led. 
They are designed to facilitate access to research funding. As a result, UK-based academics planning 
research collaborations will find themselves encouraged – or even constrained, to ensure eligibility – 
to work with colleagues in their university’s partner institutions, rather than choosing and building 
their own networks. These two consequences would operate together to increase collaboration and 
mobility within the partnership, while rendering such interchange more structural and less 
individual. 
Third, closer partnerships between UK universities and universities in the EU27 are likely to impact 
those EU27 universities as well, with potential longer-term implications for the higher education 
culture in EU Member States. To some extent this would build on and encourage existing trends: 
                                                          
26 Quirin Schiermeier, ‘British universities set up European outposts as Brexit looms’, Nature, 22 October 2018, 
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-07121-6, accessed 12 February 2019. 
27 University of Glasgow, University News, ‘University Of Glasgow Signs Major European Partnership 
Agreement’, 19 June 2018 
 https://www.gla.ac.uk/news/archiveofnews/2018/june/headline_592598_en.html, accessed 12 February 
2019.  
28 University of Warwick, News and Events, ‘University of Warwick launches major teaching and 
research collaboration with partners in Paris and Brussels’, 28 March 2018 
https://warwick.ac.uk/newsandevents/pressreleases/university_of_warwick_launches_major_teaching_and_r
esearch_collaboration_with_partners_in_paris_and_brussels1/, accessed 12 February 2019.  
29 University of Oxford, News and Events, ‘Wide-ranging new research partnership with Berlin 
universities’, 12 December 2017 
 http://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2017-12-12-wide-ranging-new-research-partnership-berlin-universities, accessed 
12 February 2019.  
towards a more international student body, more teaching in English, and joint degree programmes 
for example.  
As these final observations demonstrate, we are in highly speculative territory, not least because the 
type of Brexit (and future relationship) we will undergo is still so uncertain. However, the questions 
and possibilities raised here derive from real changes; while our forecasts may be uncertain, we can 
be sure that early career law academics will be launching into a rapidly changing academic 
environment.  
 
 
 
 
